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Hypnosis originated as a healing practice and its historical roots can be traced back to 
the ideas and methods of the physician Franz Anton Mesmer in 18th century Europe.  As 
we now understand it hypnosis is a normal psychological phenomenon that can be in-
vestigated in the laboratory and understood in terms of mainstream psychology and the 
neurosciences.  Normally one would expect there to be continuity between experimental 
research and theory on the one hand and the practical application of hypnosis on the 
other.  In this paper it is suggested that there is reason to question how much the clini-
cal application of hypnosis is informed by the non-clinical scientific evidence and even 
whether clinicians can be said to be using hypnosis as it is now defined and understood in 
the academic literature.  These matters are also briefly addressed by reference to certain 
other contexts in which hypnosis is applied.  
Introduction
Implicit or explicit in most descriptions of hyp-
nosis are two key components, namely the ‘hyp-
notic trance’ (or ‘altered state of consciousness’) 
and the use of suggestion.  The two are presumed 
to be linked in that the subject is more responsive 
to suggestions when he or she is ‘in a hypnotic 
state’.  A third component, namely the ‘induction 
of hypnosis’, also links the two; the induction it-
self is a series of suggestions that directs or guides 
the subject into the hypnotic state.  Finally one 
can distinguish a fourth component, suggestibil-
ity or hypnotic susceptibility, which is the inher-
ent responsiveness of the subject to suggestion.  
In this paper I examine the relationship 
between the two key components of hypnosis 
identified above — trance and suggestion — and 
explore the significance afforded to each in the 
historical development of hypnosis and in the 
various contexts in which hypnosis is said to 
be taking place, notably the laboratory and the 
clinic.  On this basis I shall raise the question 
whether the disparity in the way hypnosis is rep-
resented and applied in these different contexts 
is often so wide that we may doubt whether the 
theoreticians and the practitioners are describing 
the same phenomenon.  
The historical antecedents of 
modern hypnosis
A good starting point for this enquiry is to remind 
ourselves of the historical development of modern 
hypnosis, the true origins of which can be traced 
directly back to 18th century Europe and the ideas 
and practices of the Austrian physician Franz 
Anton Mesmer (1734–1815).  Recall that Mesmer 
proposed the existence of a universal force that he 
eventually called ‘animal magnetism’.  Illness was 
associated with disturbances in the natural tidal 
flow of animal magnetism in the body and Mes-
mer claimed the ability to restore this and thus 
heal the patient.  His preferred technique was to 
make slow passes with his hands over the patient’s 
body from the head to the toe.  In response to 
this, patients would experience ‘crises’ (swooning, 
convulsing, shaking, crying, laughing hysterically, 
etc).  Finally they would appear to enter some kind 
of stupor with a glazed look in their eyes.  Most 
famously he devised group treatment methods at 
his salons in Paris in the 1770s and 80s.  
How the theory and practice of hypnosis to-
day evolved from the methodology and ideas of 
mesmerism is a fascinating and instructive story 
(see Gauld, 1992, for a comprehensive history). 
In summary (Heap, 2008a) first there was the ac-
knowledgement that central aspects of mesmeric 
practice, such as the bacquet, the mesmerist’s 
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passes, and the patients’ crises, were unneces-
sary for the purposes of treatment.  Mental and 
physical relaxation became the more characteris-
tic response of the patient from the start of the 
procedure.  Secondly we see the development of 
theories based on biological accounts of the hu-
man nervous system at the time.  Later, psycho-
logical explanations were advanced and verbal 
suggestion became the core feature of hypnosis, 
both procedurally and theoretically.  Finally it 
was established quite early on that people varied 
in their responsiveness to hypnosis, only a minor-
ity being very susceptible.
One way of characterising this evolutionary 
process is to say that gradually the role of a spe-
cial state or trance assumed less significance and 
the role of suggestion became more pivotal, along 
with suggestibility.  This process in fact occurred 
very early on with the investigation by the 1784 
Royal Commission of animal magnetism and 
its conclusion that mesmeric phenomena were 
attributable to the subject’s imagination (Salas 
& Salas, 1996).  A later illustration is the resolu-
tion of the dispute that continued for around 20 
years, again in France, during the latter part of the 
19th century between Jean-Martin Charcot and 
Hippolyte Bernheim and their associates (Gauld, 
1992).  Charcot drew comparisons between hyp-
notic phenomena and neurotic symptoms in his 
hysterical patients.  He proposed a three-stage 
model of hypnosis, namely lethargy, then cata-
lepsy, then somnambulism.  However, Bernheim 
demonstrated that the entire range of hypnotic 
phenomena could be elicited in 15% of the normal 
population.  He was also very critical of Charcot’s 
three-stage model and demonstrated that these 
stages were not representative of the usual re-
sponse of subjects to hypnosis.  According to 
Bernheim (1888/1973) hypnosis is ‘the induction 
of a peculiar psychical condition which increases 
susceptibility to suggestion’ (p. 15).  This emphasis 
on suggestion can be seen in the titles of several 
of his writings including his book whose title in 
the English translation is Hypnosis and sugges-
tion in psychotherapy: A treatise on the nature and 
uses of hypnotism (Bernheim, 1988/1973).  One 
of his students, Émile Coué, became famous for 
establishing a system of psychotherapy based on 
repeated autosuggestion without the induction of 
hypnosis. 
Modern theoretical 
approaches to hypnosis
I shall now fast-forward this brief account of the 
evolution of hypnosis to developments during the 
second half of the 20th century.  The identifica-
tion of a particular theoretical position on hyp-
nosis (or its forerunner, mesmerism) with a key 
individual continued throughout much of this 
period.  However, unlike earlier formulations, the 
theories and models proposed by these writers 
were based on well-controlled laboratory experi-
ments on normal participants.  I refer the reader 
to Lynne and Rhue (1991) and Nash and Barnier 
(2008) for comprehensive accounts.
Before proceeding, it is important to briefly 
acquaint the reader unfamiliar with this work 
with what a laboratory session of hypnosis may 
consist of.  Firstly the experimenter will perform 
a hypnotic induction procedure that usually 
consists of suggestions of mental and physical 
relaxation and an inner focus of attention (say 
on pleasant imagery).  Then he or she will ad-
minister various suggestions that certain things 
are happening to the subjects or that they are in 
certain situations that would, if they were real, 
significantly affect the way they are perceiving, 
thinking, feeling and behaving.  Examples of sug-
gestions are as follows: that one arm is becoming 
light and will float in the air; that an arm is too 
heavy for the subjects to lift; that one hand is im-
mersed in ice and is feeling numb and insensitive; 
that subjects can smell their favourite perfume; 
that they see their best friend in front of them; 
that they cannot see an object in front of them or 
hear a particular sound; and that they are reliving 
an event from childhood.  Some suggestions are 
intended to take effect after the subject has been 
alerted and are termed ‘post-hypnotic’.  The ex-
tent to which the subjects respond to these sug-
gestions and experience the effects as realistic and 
automatic varies from person to person; some are 
highly responsive, some do not respond at all, 
and most lie somewhere in between.   
The main issue of contention amongst mod-
ern theorists has been whether, in order to explain 
hypnotic phenomena such as enhanced suggest-
ibility, it is necessary to posit an altered state of 
consciousness or whether all can be accounted 
for by reference to concepts and processes from 
mainstream social and cognitive psychology such 
as imagination, expectancy and role enactment. 
The assault on state theories of hypnosis has been 
quite intense, to the extent that sceptics have felt 
entitled to say that ‘hypnosis is a myth’ or ‘there is 
no such thing as hypnosis’ (see Baker, 1990, for a 
highly sceptical exposition of hypnosis).  
Despite the ferocity of the debate between the 
‘state’ or ‘special process’ supporters and those 
who adopt the socio-cognitive position, there is 
good evidence that over the last 10 years or so 
a greater consensus on the fundamental nature 
of hypnosis has emerged in the academic litera-
ture.  (A comparison between the chapters in, 
say, Lynne and Rhue, 1991, and the theoretical 
Post-hypnotic 
suggestion  
A suggestion that is admin-
istered during hypnosis but 
is intended to take effect 
following termination of the 
hypnotic experience.
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accounts in Nash and Barnier, 2008, bears this 
out.)  It is my belief that the modern state-versus-
non-state controversy parallels the earlier conflict 
between the relative significance of the induction 
of ‘trance’ on the one hand and the process of sug-
gestion and suggestibility on the other, and that 
this is how it is being resolved.  Let me explain 
further.
First, laboratory studies of hypnosis on nor-
mal volunteers have demonstrated that the tradi-
tional hypnotic induction procedure is not essen-
tial in enhancing the suggestibility of the subject. 
In fact, responsiveness following an induction is, 
overall, only moderately higher than when sug-
gestions are administered without an induction 
(‘waking suggestions’) and for some subjects 
there is no increase and even a decrease (Kirsch 
& Braffman, 1999).  Moreover, when the tradi-
tional induction is replaced by ‘task-motivational 
instructions’ or an ‘alert-active’ induction (sug-
gestions of increasing awareness, alertness and 
energy and sometimes substitution of the chair 
or couch with an exercise bicycle), or injection of 
a (inert) ‘hypnosis pill’ or inhalation of a (inert) 
‘hypnosis gas’, then the same increase in suggest-
ibility is found (Baker & Kirsch, 1993; Bányai & 
Hilgard, 1976; Barber & Calverley, 1963; Glass & 
Barber 1963).  Hence, the role of the hypnotic in-
duction may simply be to enhance the subject’s 
expectancy and his or her commitment and moti-
vation to engage in the suggestions to follow. 
This conclusion is consistent with a recent 
investigation by McGeown, Mazzoni, Venneri, 
and Kirsch (2009) who analysed fMRI scans of 
subjects undergoing a hypnotic induction con-
sisting of suggestions of mental and physical re-
laxation.  Highly suggestible participants showed 
decreased activity in the anterior parts of the ‘de-
fault mode’ circuit but no increase in other cor-
tical regions.  The ‘default mode’ network refers 
to cortical areas that are active in the absence of 
goal-directed activity.  In low suggestible partici-
pants the hypnotic induction produced no such 
changes but appeared to deactivate areas involved 
in alertness.  These results suggest that the mode 
of action of the hypnotic induction, at least with 
highly suggestible people, is to prime them to re-
spond more effectively to the suggestions to fol-
low.  Importantly the data confirm that relaxation 
is not a critical factor in this regard.
Secondly, there is good evidence that hypnot-
ic suggestibility is a stable trait (Piccione, Hilgard 
& Zimbardo, 1989).  This is in contrast to a strong 
socio-cognitive position such as that adopted by 
Nicholas Spanos and his colleagues, namely that 
differences in suggestibility are determined by 
the subjects’ attitudes to hypnosis and their re-
sponse styles (Gorassini & Spanos, 1999; Spanos, 
1991; Spanos, Cross, Menary & Smith, 1988). 
According to this approach, unlike low respond-
ers, highly responsive subjects have a positive 
attitude to hypnosis and willingly become ‘stra-
tegically involved’.  Hence unresponsive individu-
als can be trained to become more responsive by 
changing their attitudes and encouraging them 
to adopt a ‘strategic’ approach when responding 
to suggestions.  There is, however, good evidence 
now that a person’s suggestibility is constant over 
time and is, at least in part, genetically deter-
mined (Horton & Crawford, 2004; Lichtenberg, 
Bachner-Melman, Ebstein & Crawford, 2004; 
Morgan 1973).
It is instructive for the present thesis to stay 
for a moment on the subject of measuring re-
sponsiveness to hypnotic suggestion.  It is has 
long been recognised that there are significant 
and reliable differences between hypnotic sugges-
tions in terms of the proportion of subjects who 
respond to (i.e. ‘pass’) them.  For example on the 
Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale Form C 
(SHSS:C; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962), 92% of 
subjects in the normative group passed the ‘hand 
lowering’ suggestion, 43% passed ‘age regression’, 
and only 9% passed ‘negative visual hallucination’. 
In this sense it is meaningful to talk about some 
suggestions being more ‘difficult’ than others and 
in earlier clinical texts (e.g. Hartland, 1971) the 
ability of subjects to respond positively to sug-
gestions was interpreted as indicating the ‘depth 
of trance’ that they had attained (light, medium 
or deep).  Traditionally, the deeper the trance the 
more profound the subjective response to sugges-
tions of changes in experience, such as hallucina-
tions, analgesia, amnesia, and age regression.  
Nowadays, at least for research purposes, a 
person’s ‘hypnotisabilty’ is measured by various 
standardised scales that are well-researched and 
have good psychometric properties (Woody & 
Barnier, 2008).  The most widely used are those 
developed in the 1950s and 1960s by André 
Weizenhoffer and Ernest Hilgard, namely the 
Stanford Scales of Hypnotic Susceptibility 
(Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1959, 1962).  They each 
consist of a range of suggestions, and the sub-
ject’s responsiveness to each suggestion is scored. 
Collectively the scores attained for the sugges-
tions yield a total score that, within the general 
population, has a broad distribution and a clear 
central tendency.  The scales typically include a 
traditional hypnotic induction but this may be 
dispensed with and some scales do not include 
an induction at all.  Suggestions not preceded 
by an induction are often called ‘waking sugges-
tions’ and Kirsch (1997) has cogently pointed out 
that the correlation between waking and hyp-
notic suggestibility is as high as the test-retest 
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reliability of the standard scales.  He proposes that 
hypnotisability may be defined as the increment 
in suggestibility following a hypnotic induction 
procedure and that imaginative and hypnotic sug-
gestibility denote suggestibility before and after 
induction respectively.
The point to note here is that the histori-
cal development of hypnosis, with the change in 
emphasis from trance to suggestion and suggest-
ibility, has left writers with an embarrassment of 
names for the instruments designed to measure 
subjects’ responsivity.  Are they suggestibility 
scales, hypnotisability scales, hypnotic suggestibil-
ity scales, hypnotic susceptibility scales, hypnotic 
responsivity scales, or what?  The present writer’s 
opinion is that they are primarily suggestibility 
scales but, in view of the fact that the term ‘sug-
gestibility’ can refer to a number of different and 
unrelated human characteristics, to avoid ambi-
guity the term ‘hypnotic suggestibility’ may be the 
preferred one.    
The third reason for the emerging consen-
sus is the increasing body of evidence from 
neuroscientific research using behavioural and 
brain scanning techniques that indicate that 
subjects who score high on hypnotic suggestibil-
ity scales are different from those who score low, 
not merely when responding to suggestions but 
on other measures outside of the hypnotic con-
text (Gruzelier, 1998; Horton & Crawford, 2004; 
Oakley & Halligan, 2010; D. Spiegel, 2008).  This 
research not only provides strong support for the 
trait interpretation of suggestibility, but also in-
dicates that those subjects who appear to be re-
sponding to suggestion are indeed having experi-
ences that seem real to them and correspond with 
the intended effects.  They are not merely comply-
ing, acting the part, or using conscious cognitive 
strategies available to all subjects, even those who 
present as unsusceptible.  
One of the main focuses of current theory and 
experimental research is the construction and re-
finement of neurophysiological and neurocogni-
tive models that account for successful respond-
ing to suggestion and the differences between 
responsive and unresponsive individuals.  A key 
concept is dissociation or, as some writers prefer, 
‘cognitive inhibition’ and there has been much de-
bate where this process is located within the cog-
nitive-behavioural system.  Excellent reviews of 
current developments are to be found in Section 
II of Nash and Barnier (2008).  The experimental 
methodology is characterised by a rigorous scien-
tific approach and both research and theory are 
informed by developments in the field of cogni-
tion and the neurosciences in general, an essential 
requirement for any modern theory aimed at ac-
counting for the range of hypnotic phenomena.
A modern definition of hypnosis
Throughout its history, writers have struggled to 
agree on a definition of hypnosis.  The following 
definition by a well-respected authority in the 
field is an example of a consensus understanding 
of hypnosis based on current theories and experi-
mental research:     
Hypnosis is a process in which one per-
son, designated the hypnotist, offers sug-
gestions to another person, designated 
the subject, for imaginative experiences 
entailing alterations in perception, mem-
ory and action. . . . (T)hese experiences 
are associated with a degree of subjective 
conviction bordering on delusion, and an 
experienced involuntariness bordering on 
compulsion.’  Kihlstrom (2008, p. 21)
Contrast this with the ideas and practices of 
Mesmer and his followers.  Note also the empha-
sis on suggestion and suggestibility rather than 
on the assumption of some special state of con-
sciousness as a prerequisite for experiencing the 
suggested effects. 
Clinical hypnosis
If we simply define hypnosis as what takes place 
when people say they are ‘doing hypnosis’ then by 
far the greatest proportion of this activity is un-
dertaken by people such as physicians, psycholo-
gists, dentists, psychotherapists, counsellors and 
hypnotherapists with their patients and clients. 
Indeed, as we have seen, the historical roots of 
hypnosis lie in the practice of medicine and not 
the study of general psychology.  Concerning 
this, the behaviourist Clarke Hull, who pioneered 
the laboratory investigation of hypnosis and sug-
gestion, had this to say:
We have already seen the dominant mo-
tive throughout the history of hypnotism 
has been clinical, that of curing human 
ills.  A worse method for the establish-
ment of scientific principles amongst 
highly elusive phenomena can hardly be 
devised.  (Hull, 1933, p. 18) 
This makes sense when we consider that, just 
as the practice of medicine is rigorously ground-
ed in academic sciences such as anatomy, physi-
ology and biochemistry, so we would expect the 
clinical application of hypnosis to be informed by 
mainstream disciplines such as cognitive and so-
cial psychology and the neurosciences.  
My experience over the last 33 years of 
studying hypnosis, attending numerous train-
ing events and international conferences, and 
Imaginative 
suggestibility  
A person’s responsivity 
to suggestions when they 
are not preceded by a 
hypnotic induction proce-
dure (also termed ‘waking 
suggestibility’).
Dissociation  
The suppression from con-
scious awareness of experi-
ences, memories, percep-
tions and so on of which one 
would normally be aware; 
this includes the ability to 
be aware of or engage in 
two or more incompatible 
experiences, cognitions or 
activities without con-
sciously acknowledging any 
inconsistency.
Cognitive inhibition 
The active suppression of a 
cognitive response such as a 
thought or memory.
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communicating with academic and clinical col-
leagues across the world has consistently caused 
me to wonder how much the rationale of clini-
cal hypnosis is based on the experimental re-
search findings and theoretical refinements that 
are summarised in the previous section.  I also 
wonder to what extent hypnotic processes as elu-
cidated by laboratory research are instrumental in 
therapeutic hypnosis, even when the outcome is a 
successful one.  
If we approach hypnosis from the standpoint 
of its various therapeutic or clinical applications, 
a common assumption is that the patient is placed 
in some kind of psychophysiological state that is 
beneficial in itself (e.g. some form of mental and 
physical relaxation in which self-healing is pro-
moted) and which facilitates the person’s respon-
siveness to healing or persuasive influences in the 
form of hypnotic suggestions.  There is one fur-
ther claim that many practitioners make, namely 
that hypnosis facilitates access to ‘the unconscious 
mind’.  
There are a number of assertions here that I 
shall now expand on, though only to the extent 
that is possible within a single article. 
Hypnosis as a special state
A principle assumption of clinical hypnosis has 
always been that it is a special state of the mind. 
However what has emerged from laboratory stud-
ies of hypnosis is that this does not play a central 
role, if it plays any role at all, the emphasis being 
on  suggestion and suggestibility. 
A more general description of hypnosis is that 
of profound relaxation.  In their descriptions of 
hypnosis, for example in their brochures and on 
their websites, clinicians often inform potential 
clients or patients that hypnosis is a state of physi-
cal and mental relaxation.  The description of 
hypnosis on the website of the European Society 
of Hypnosis (ESH) is fairly standard and includes 
the following:
During the induction of trance, concen-
tration is distracted from external stim-
uli and directed to internal sensations.  
Usually a state of physical relaxation is 
achieved as a first sign.  Hypnosis is not a 
stereotyped ‘relaxation programme’ but is 
tailored individually.  Relaxation in hyp-
nosis is associated with a calming of bio-
logical rhythms like breathing and heart 
rate.  This makes it possible for every pa-
tient to individually focus on inner expe-
riences.  Hypnosis promotes the ability to 
relax during various treatments and thus 
to take responsibility for one’s own well-
being.  (Schulze, undated)
Understandably, hypnosis is often com-
pared to relaxation procedures such as progres-
sive muscular relaxation, autogenic training and 
biofeedback.  It is also compared with Eastern 
meditative practices such as transcendental med-
itation, mindfulness, and Qigong (Edmonston, 
1981; Holroyd, 2003; Huang, 2008; Lynn, Das, 
Hallquist & Williams, 2006).  For example the 
Taiwanese psychiatrist Wei-Ching Huang (2008) 
has this to say about the growth of interest in hyp-
nosis in Taiwan: 
It is worthwhile to point out that, with-
in the Chinese society, the traditional 
Qigong of the Daoists and Zen meditation 
of the Buddhists, all involve the altered 
conscious state by developing hypnotic-
like condition. . . .  If Qigong or Zen medi-
tation is guided by the master for the stu-
dents, it even becomes more similar to the 
induction of hypnosis by the therapist to 
the clients. . . .  In another word, the prac-
tice of hypnosis is observed in the Eastern 
and Western traditional customs and it is 
a pan-culture phenomenon.  (p. 29)
A modern approach to understanding hyp-
nosis that incorporates relaxation as its pivotal 
process is that described by Edmonston (1991). 
He has postulated that ‘neutral hypnosis’, that 
is hypnosis limited to a standard induction and 
deepening routine, is equivalent to relaxation 
and that phenomena that are labelled ‘hypnotic’ 
are merely facilitated by relaxation.  He proposed 
that we use the word ‘anesis’ as a more appropri-
ate label, but this has not proved a popular term. 
The theory has not been instrumental in gener-
ating much research activity and is not generally 
accepted.  
A state of relaxation and an inner focus of 
attention is indeed an accurate description of 
what people usually experience when undergoing 
hypnosis in the clinical context and there is good 
reason for this.  There is convincing evidence 
that relaxation procedures such as those that 
are used as traditional hypnotic inductions have 
therapeutic value in treating a range of conditions 
such as stress, anxiety disorders, and psychoso-
matic problems, as well as helping patients cope 
with uncomfortable medical and dental proce-
dures and childbirth (see Lynn, Rhue & Kirsch, 
2010, for comprehensive reviews of this work). 
However, as we have seen in the previous section, 
a state of relaxation is not a defining feature of 
hypnosis as it is studied in the laboratory, whereas 
suggestion and suggestibility are.  
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Of course, hypnotic relaxation procedures do 
use suggestion to achieve their ends.  However, 
there is little to indicate that the state of mental 
and physical relaxation thus achieved is funda-
mentally different from that derived by other 
methods, including the various forms of medita-
tion (Benham & Younger, 2008; Wagstaff, 1981). 
Also, there are many occasions during hypnotic 
treatment when a patient may not be particular-
ly relaxed and may even be in a highly aroused 
state, as when he or she is reliving an exciting or a 
traumatic memory.  No one suggests that at such 
times the patient has ceased to be ‘hypnotised’.
Now, it is certainly the case that in the labo-
ratory, just as in the clinic, induction procedures 
incorporating suggestions of mental and physi-
cal relaxation are commonly used and hence, in 
this context also, participants are likely to find 
the experience very relaxing.  However, the point 
I am making is this: in the laboratory relaxation 
is found not to be an essential property of hyp-
nosis whereas in the clinic it is considered to be 
so.  Thus in this fundamental way, hypnosis as it 
is studied and understood in the laboratory is not 
the same as hypnosis as it is understood in the 
clinical context.
Suggestions in the laboratory and 
in the clinic
I have already described the kinds of hypnotic 
suggestions that are studied in the laboratory.  Ex-
amples of hypnotic suggestions that are regularly 
used in treatment are those intended to produce 
physical relaxation and calmness, control or dim-
inution of pain and other symptoms, the reliving 
of an important memory (perhaps by suggestions 
of age regression), and the experience of an un-
pleasant sensation (as in covert sensitisation for 
smoking).     
Unlike in the laboratory, in the clinic the aim 
of many hypnotic suggestions is that they bring 
about desirable behavioural, cognitive and emo-
tional changes of an enduring nature, not changes 
that last only for the duration of the therapy ses-
sion; hence the extensive use of post-hypnotic 
suggestion.  For example it is often suggested to 
patients that as soon as they start to experience 
their problem in their daily life (undue anxiety, 
pain, negative self-referential thoughts, a compul-
sion to perform an undesired habit, and so on) 
their symptom- or habit-control strategies will 
immediately take effect and they will thus success-
fully deal with the situation (see Heap & Aravind, 
2002, for examples of these).  Some post-hypnotic 
suggestions are more general; these include confi-
dence building or ‘ego strengthening’ suggestions 
such as ‘Every day… your nerves will become 
stronger and steadier… your mind calmer and 
clearer… more composed… more placid… more 
tranquil’.  (Hartland, 1971, p. 201)
In the laboratory it has been found that al-
though responding to suggestions during hypno-
sis and post-hypnosis feels very compulsive and 
automatic to the highly suggestible subject, there 
are limitations on their influence once the hyp-
notic context is terminated.  Firstly, responding 
does involve cognitive effort on the subject’s part 
(Barnier & McConkey, 1996, 1998, 2001) and may 
be over-ridden by the subject’s own volition or by 
competing habits.  Very importantly, the influ-
ence of a suggestion is determined by the explicit 
and implicit demands of the context; when those 
demands are perceived as no longer operative, the 
subject stops responding.  For example, in experi-
ments on highly susceptible subjects the response 
to post-hypnotic suggestion ceases when the ex-
periment appears to have been temporarily sus-
pended or when the subjects perceive themselves 
as no longer under an obligation to behave in the 
manner required by the experimenter, or even, al-
though not always, when they are no longer under 
his or her surveillance (Damaser, Whitehouse, 
Orne, Orne & Dinges, 2010; Fisher, 1954; Spanos, 
Menary, Brett, Cross & Ahmed, 1987; St Jean, 
1978).  For this reason also, the influence of the 
suggestion is likely to diminish over time.
The question I am now posing is this: to what 
extent are therapeutic suggestions (including 
post-hypnotic suggestions and self-suggestions) 
in the clinical context equivalent to hypnotic sug-
gestions in the laboratory and to what extent do 
they operate in the same way?  There is not a great 
deal of direct evidence that in the experimental 
context hypnotic suggestion itself can bring about 
such significant and enduring changes in a per-
son’s life of the kind that are witnessed when a 
person responds successfully to therapy.  That the 
therapeutic protocols provided by clinical hypno-
sis are of proven efficacy is not in question here; 
however one is entitled to ask whether their effi-
cacy is due to hypnosis as it is studied in the labo-
ratory and on which current theoretical models 
are based or whether non-hypnotic processes are 
at work.  
By ‘non-hypnotic’ processes I do not just 
mean general effects such as the therapeutic al-
liance and the patient’s expectation of change. 
Many hypnotherapeutic manoeuvres are very 
similar to behavioural methods such as various 
relaxation and anxiety management procedures, 
imaginative rehearsal of coping strategies, and 
covert conditioning techniques such as imaginal 
desensitisation, sensitisation, reinforcement, and 
modelling (Cautela & Kearney, 1986; Cautela & 
Ego strengthening 
Refers to a series of sugges-
tions, usually of a general 
nature, that are intended to 
enhance the subject’s self-
confidence and self-esteem.
Covert sensitisation 
A form of conditioning in 
which an imagined stimulus, 
such as a cigarette, is paired 
with an imagined aversive 
stimulus or event until the 
aversive reaction is triggered 
by the first stimulus alone.
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McCoullough, 1978).  The rationale for adopt-
ing such procedures is not hypnotic suggestion 
and suggestibility but learning and conditioning 
processes.  
One way of addressing the above question 
is by investigating whether there is any relation-
ship between outcome of hypnotherapy and the 
patients’ scores on hypnotic suggestibility scales. 
This point was made by Evans (1991) when he 
asked, ‘Can obtained treatment changes be spe-
cifically attributed to hypnosis rather than to the 
non-specific effects of the hypnotic relationship?’ 
He then goes on to say, ‘Such an attribution can 
be made only if individual differences in hypnoti-
sability correlate with the extent of treatment suc-
cess’ (page 159).  Of course one still expects other 
predictors of outcome to be influential such as 
rapport with the therapist, positive expectation, 
and commitment to the therapy.    
There are numerous published clinical trials 
investigating hypnosis in the treatment of a vari-
ety of conditions and problems in which the hyp-
notic suggestibility of the patients has been mea-
sured by standard scales.  Several reviews of this 
work have been undertaken (Barnier & Council, 
2010; Flammer & Alladin, 2007; Lynn, Boycheva 
& Barnes, 2008; Lynn, Meyer & Shindler, 2004; 
Pinnell & Covino, 2000; Waddern and Anderton, 
1982).  The results give a very mixed and confus-
ing picture.  There are many papers reporting suc-
cessful outcomes for a wide range of problems in 
which the hypnotic suggestibility of the patients 
was not a significant factor, and in many others 
the relationship proved to be weak.  There ap-
pears to be a tendency for hypnotic suggestibility 
to correlate with outcome in those problems that 
have a somatic component (e.g. pain — includ-
ing headaches — warts, asthma and dermatologi-
cal conditions) in contrast to problems involving 
voluntary behaviour such as smoking and obesity 
(Barnier & Council, 2010; Flammer & Alladin, 
2007; Wadden and Anderton, 1982), but this has 
not proved to be a consistent finding. 
One problem with these investigations is 
that the mere indication that the patient is not 
responsive to suggestions, either while formally 
testing his or her hypnotic suggestibility or dur-
ing therapy itself, may weaken the confidence and 
expectations of both patient and therapist that a 
successful outcome will be forthcoming and this 
itself can have a deleterious effect on outcome. 
Significantly, Pinnell & Covino (2000) note that 
the relationship between outcome and hypnotic 
suggestibility may be absent if the latter is mea-
sured after the conclusion of treatment and in a 
different context.  Also, probably more often than 
not, hypnosis is just one adjunctive component 
of the treatment being carried out; hence its rela-
tive contribution to outcome may be difficult to 
quantify.  
There is one difference between the labora-
tory and the clinical context that should be noted, 
namely that laboratory studies of suggestion and 
suggestibility normally consist of one session 
whereas a course of therapy usually consists of 
several treatment sessions.  Also the patient is of-
ten encouraged to practise ‘self-hypnosis’ or ‘au-
to-hypnosis’ (using a taped recording).  Perhaps 
the potency of the hypnotherapeutic suggestions 
is thereby strengthened.  This may be the case, but 
we would still expect a clear relationship between 
hypnotic suggestibility and outcome.  Also there 
are non-hypnotic processes whereby treatment 
efficacy is enhanced with repeated sessions, nota-
bly covert rehearsal and practice of the therapeu-
tic techniques and strategies. 
In summary, the weakness, elusiveness and 
inconsistency of any relationship between hyp-
notic suggestibility, as measured formally, and 
the outcome of hypnotic treatment raise doubts 
about the extent to which clinical hypnosis, even 
when it is effective, involves the same processes 
and mechanisms as hypnosis studied in the lab-
oratory and upon which existing theories are 
based.  
Should hypnotic suggestibility scales be used 
routinely in the clinic?  Some clinicians have de-
veloped protocols whereby decisions about treat-
ment are informed by the patient’s measured 
hypnotic suggestibility or susceptibility (e.g. H. 
Spiegel, 2007; Wickramasekera, 1993).  More gen-
erally, writers often lament the reluctance of clini-
cians to adopt this procedure (see, e.g., Barnier 
& Council, 2010).  However, if there is strength 
in the above conclusion then we may question 
whether there is any good reason for clinicians to 
formally measure hypnotic suggestibility prior to 
embarking on treatment.
Hypnosis and the unconscious
Earlier modern texts on the clinical applications 
of hypnosis made extensive use of ‘the uncon-
scious mind’ in two ways.  The first, perhaps un-
der the influence of Émile Coué, is the idea that 
suggestions are effective when they, in a manner 
of speaking, become ‘implanted in the uncon-
scious (or subconscious) mind’ (Hartland, 1971). 
This notion is, in my experience, not evident in 
more recent texts with the exception of the Er-
icksonian literature, which I shall mention later.  
The second claim concerning hypnosis and 
the unconscious is that hypnosis allows access to 
repressed feelings, ideas and memories that are 
not expressed consciously.  According to Yapko 
(1990):
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Because of the dual nature of the human 
mind (i.e. conscious and unconscious), 
memories and details that may have been 
repressed or else simply escaped detec-
tion by the conscious mind may not have 
escaped the person’s unconscious mind.  
(p. 74)
Hypnosis is considered to be a way of access-
ing this material.  (Nowadays it is more custom-
ary to refer to these experiences as ‘dissociated’ 
rather than ‘repressed’.)
This property that is ascribed to clinical hyp-
nosis is not one that is generally claimed by those 
researching hypnosis in the laboratory.  However, 
a rationale is provided by Hilgard’s neo-dissocia-
tion theory and its investigation in the laboratory 
(Hilgard, 1986).  This theory adopts an everyday 
understanding of dissociation whereby we assign 
attentional priority to particular activities or ex-
periences while simultaneously engaging in other 
activities or while unaware of other ongoing expe-
riences (e.g. not being aware of pain while attend-
ing to an emergency).  In simple terms, hypnotic 
suggestions are a means of directly controlling 
this process.  Thus, for example, when responding 
to arm levitation, the subject is consciously aware 
that the arm is rising but is unaware of the effort 
of lifting it; thus the arm appears to him or her to 
be moving ‘on its own’.   
One way that Hilgard demonstrated his mod-
el was by the ‘hidden observer’ effect (Hilgard, 
1979, 1986).  The classic demonstration of this 
involves the elicitation of ‘true’ ratings of isch-
aemic pain by highly hypnotisable subjects who 
are responsive to suggestions of profound analge-
sia.  During hypnotic analgesia the experimenter 
suggests that there is a hidden or ‘unhypnotised’ 
part of the mind that can give the pain ratings ‘out 
of awareness’.  These ratings are duly revealed in 
writing or by pressing numbered keys.
The exact mechanism of the hidden observ-
er remains a topic of some controversy (see e.g. 
Kirsch & Lynn, 1998).  However it may provide a 
rationale, albeit a rather tenuous one, for the idea 
that hypnosis allows access to information that is 
already dissociated — i.e. inhibited from conscious 
expression by, in terms of Hilgard’s theory, ‘an 
amnesic barrier’.  Hypnotherapeutic procedures 
that exploit this idea include what are termed ‘ex-
ploratory’ and ‘uncovering techniques’ or simply 
‘hypnoanalysis’ (Cheek & Le Cron, 1968; Kroger, 
1977; Waxman, 1989).  For example it may be sug-
gested to the patient that slight involuntary finger 
movements signal the messages ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘don’t 
know’ and ‘don’t want to say’ in response to ques-
tions by the therapist such as ‘Is your problem 
related to something that happened in the past?’. 
Other methods are dream suggestion and the 
‘theatre technique’ whereby it is suggested that 
the patient is watching a play or a movie that will 
help explain in some way the reasons for his or 
her problems and their possible resolution.  
The usefulness of these procedures is not 
being disputed here (for further discussion see 
Heap & Aravind, 2002), only their relationship to 
the understanding of hypnosis that has emerged 
from laboratory research.  It seems that once 
again the interpretation of hypnosis by the clini-
cal hypnotist places much more emphasis on the 
‘special state’ concept as opposed to suggestion 
and suggestibility which is the focus of experi-
mental and theoretical interpretations.  
It is appropriate to ask if this really matters, 
since the main concern of the clinician is to ob-
tain good therapeutic results, even if the assump-
tions on which the treatment are based do not 
match those derived from experimental investi-
gations.  In this case it matters a great deal.  
During the 1990s and up to the present day, 
thousands of adults in America, Europe and 
Australia have come genuinely to believe that one 
or both of their parents or other members of their 
family sexually abused them, often quite exten-
sively, when they were children, despite there be-
ing no evidence that this had occurred.  The ma-
jority of these cases of ‘false memories’ of abuse 
have been due to the suggestive influence of psy-
chotherapists (Brandon, Boakes, Glaser, Green, 
MacKeith & Whewell, 1997).  Prior to therapy 
the patients had no knowledge or memory of 
any such abuse.  In a survey of 4,400 families of 
the US False Memory Foundation (42% response 
rate), in 86% of members charged with incest 
their accusers had undergone psychotherapy or 
psychiatric treatment (McHugh, Lief, Freyd & 
Fetkewicz, 2004).  In the UK, Boakes reports a 
rate of 75% in around 100 cases referred to her 
(Waterhouse, 2003).   
Amongst the methods that have been used 
to elicit these false memories are the hypnoana-
lytic procedures mentioned above.  Here we do 
have an instance where it is important to ground 
clinical practice in theory based on solid research 
evidence, even when that evidence is derived 
from experimental work in the laboratories of 
non-clinicians.   
Ericksonian hypnotherapy
The present discussion of hypnosis would be in-
complete without examining a significant devel-
opment in clinical hypnosis over the last 30 years, 
namely the influence of the American psychiatrist 
and psychologist Milton Erickson (1901–1980) 
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and his followers (Lankton, 2008).  This influence 
is part of a wider approach to psychotherapy in 
general that is often termed ‘strategic’ although 
there are many components of Ericksonian psy-
chotherapy, both theoretical and practical, that 
are quite distinctive (Haley, 1973, 1993).  One fun-
damental tenet is that clients have the personal 
resources to solve their problems but these are 
not immediately obvious or accessible to them. 
In other words the possible solutions can be said 
to be ‘unconscious’.  
Hypnosis is one way of facilitating access 
to these resources, the key concept being what 
Ericksonians term the ‘naturalistic trance’, in 
which it is possible for the client to suspend his 
or her ‘habitual frame of reference’ and thus dis-
cover choices otherwise not accessible to him or 
her.  Thus hypnotic communication may be said 
to bypass the critical faculties of the conscious 
mind (Yapko, 1990).  
The ‘naturalistic trance’ is an altered state of 
consciousness that is continuous with everyday 
‘trance’ experience – times when we are deeply in-
volved in an experience such as listening to some 
thrilling music, but also moments of surprise, 
shock, anticipation, suspense, confusion, inspira-
tion, and insight.  Hypnotic phenomena, that is 
the responses to hypnotic suggestions, are also 
expressed in ‘naturalistic’ terms.  For example, an 
arm lifting without apparent conscious effort is an 
everyday occurrence, likewise not noticing a pain, 
seeing something that is not there, not seeing 
something that is right in front of one, recalling 
a past event so vividly that it seems real, failing 
to recall something one has only just been told or 
even done, and so on.  
Although radical in many ways, the 
Ericksonian approach to hypnosis retains the fea-
tures of the traditional model summarised earlier: 
the patient is placed in some kind of psychophysi-
ological state that is beneficial in itself and which 
facilitates his or her responsiveness to healing 
or persuasive influences.  We also have the idea 
that hypnosis facilitates access to the unconscious 
mind, albeit one that is conceived of in positive 
terms.  As such we may question what the ap-
proach has in common with the understanding of 
hypnosis that has emerged from laboratory inves-
tigations based on mainstream cognitive science. 
This may not unduly trouble practitioners of 
Ericksonian hypnosis, but the ideas summarised 
above sit very uneasily with the latter.  
Unlike existing theories, Ericksonian ideas 
have not spawned a great deal of research.  The po-
tency of indirect methods of suggestion claimed 
by Ericksonians in the therapeutic context has 
not been demonstrated in laboratory conditions 
(Fricton & Roth, 1985; Groth-Marnet & Mitchell, 
1998; Lynn, Weekes, Matyi & Neufield, 1988; Van 
Gorp, Meyer & Dunbar, 1985). 
Other hypnotic contexts
So far I have focused on two important contexts 
involving hypnosis: the academic and experi-
mental on the one hand and the clinical on the 
other.  There are however other contexts in which 
hypnosis is involved and where it is again relevant 
to ask to what extent ideas and practice are in-
formed by current research findings on the na-
ture and properties of hypnosis in the non-clini-
cal population.  The contexts that I shall mention 
here are those in which assistance from an expert 
on hypnosis is required in a legal, medico-legal or 
forensic setting.  
A pertinent example is the use of hypnosis 
in the interrogation of eyewitnesses in criminal 
cases, a practice that goes back over 150 years 
(Gravitz, 1983).  This application appears to be 
based on the idea that when ‘in the hypnotic 
state’ a subject’s memory is much clearer than 
otherwise.  There is in fact no theoretical justifi-
cation for believing this; the laboratory evidence 
is very inconsistent and hypnotic procedures may 
lead to memory distortion and even confabula-
tion (American Medical Association, 1985; Heap, 
2008b; Wagstaff, 1999).  Because of these difficul-
ties, in several countries this particular applica-
tion of hypnosis is now deprecated (Heap, 2008b). 
Another relevant context is in legal cas-
es — civil and criminal — in which it is asserted 
that hypnosis or a related procedure has been 
involved and the hypnosis expert is instructed to 
provide the court with his or her opinion.  I have 
published a number of accounts of my own work 
in this field (Heap, 1995, 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 
2008b).  These have included claims of negligence 
against therapists and stage hypnotists, allega-
tions of sexual assault during hypnosis or simi-
lar procedures, and cases of defendants claiming 
they were hypnotised when committing the al-
leged offence.  
In these accounts I have summarised existing 
published work by authorites in these areas and, 
in some cases (e.g. Heap, 1995), the opinions of 
expert witnesses instructed by the opposing side 
in the cases described.  I have noted that in ex-
pressing their opinions, many writers and expert 
witnesses have preferred the conceptualisation of 
hypnosis that largely informs clinical practice and 
have not drawn on the current experimental re-
search evidence on suggestion and suggestibility 
as well as social and cognitive psychology gen-
erally.  For example they rely on the concept of 
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‘the hypnotic trance’ in explaining the aggrieved 
person’s experience and behaviour, for instance 
his or her apparent inability or unwillingness to 
take protecive action against the hypnotist’s un-
welcome advances; they make no reference to 
laboratory research on hypnotic suggestions for 
committing antisocial and harmful actions (e.g. 
Levitt, Aronoff, Morgan, Overley & Parrish, 
1975; Orne & Evans, 1965; see also Gibson, 1991) 
and compliance and obedience in general (e.g. 
Milgram, 1974); and they do not consider the lab-
oratory evidence on the determinants and limi-
tations of post-hypnotic responding summarised 
earlier in this paper.  
In fact, in my own experience the research 
literature on social and cognitve psychology in 
general provides convincing explanations of the 
claimant’s or complainant’s experiences and be-
haviour in most of these cases. 
Discussion
Over the years, the scientific investigation of hyp-
nosis has been hampered by the lack of an agreed 
definition of hypnosis and discussion continues 
about what should and should not be included 
(Green, Barabasz, Barrrett & Montgomery, 2005). 
Without an agreed definition researchers can-
not properly investigate hypnotic phenomena. 
If, say, as is often the case, an investigator runs 
two groups of subjects or patients, ‘hypnotic’ and 
‘non-hypnotic’, then one ought to ask what it is 
that defines this difference?  One answer may be 
that the first group experienced a hypnotic induc-
tion procedure and the second group experienced 
something else – say they listened to some music. 
In that case we have to define what distinguishes 
a procedure that is termed ‘a hypnotic induction’ 
from one that is not.  Instead of this, researchers 
simply assumed that ‘a hypnotic induction’ is a 
procedure that encourages relaxation and an in-
ner focus of attention.  In fact this is based on an 
understanding of hypnosis that is no longer char-
acteristic of modern theoretical approaches.  
Perhaps as a conquence of all of this the sci-
entific investigation of hypnosis has not simply 
shaped how hypnotic pheneomena are to be ex-
plained but how hypnosis itself is to be defined 
in the first place.  Definitions similar to that pro-
vided by Kilstrom (2008) given earlier are now 
fairly non-contentious (Green et al 2005; Heap & 
Aravind, 2002).  They have two components, one 
procedural – the hypnotist administers sugges-
tions – and one experiential – the subjects respond 
accordingly with changes in feelings, perception, 
cognition and behaviour that are experienced as 
having an involuntary and realistic or even ‘de-
lusional’ quality.  It is therefore fortunate that we 
have agreed and reliable methods of measuring 
the subject’s response.  These measuring instru-
ments reveal that responsiveness is enhanced 
when the subject is motivated, focused and en-
gaged with the procedures, whatever method is 
used to achieve this, but that an upper limit is set 
by his or her inherent level of suggestibility.    
Just from this description of hypnosis alone 
one can reasonably propose that hypnotic proce-
dures may have therapeutic applications.  It is the 
business of therapists to help bring about desir-
able changes in feelings, perceptions, thoughts 
and behaviour in their clients and patients.  This 
also describes the work of physicians or dentists 
when they are endeavouring to make a difficult 
clinical procedure more comfortable and less 
anxiety-provoking.  
I have, however, in this paper questioned the 
extent to which ‘hypnosis’ as investigated in the 
laboratory and on which existing theories are 
based, is the same as ‘hypnosis’ that is represented 
and practised by clinicians.  For example I have 
raised the matter of whether, in those clinical ap-
plications in which enduring changes are sought, 
such changes are really effected by the process of 
hypnosis as currently defined or whether they are 
due to non-hypnotic aspects of the treatment. 
That there is often no relationship, or only a weak 
one, between hypnotic suggestibility and outcome 
indicates that, for the most part, hypnosis — hyp-
nosis as defined here and as understood by those 
researching it — plays only a limited role in what is 
called clinical hypnosis or hypnotherapy.  
It has also been noted that, whereas mental 
and physical relaxation is usually described by 
clinicians as an essential property of hypnosis, 
this has not proved to be the case for hypnosis in 
the laboratory.  However, it is acknowledged that 
hypnotic suggestions may be used to promote 
mental and physical relaxation and this is a very 
common purpose of hypnosis in the clinic. 
Finally I have observed that psychotherapists 
who use hypnosis claim that it improves recall 
and facilitates access to the unconscious mind, 
leading, say, to the recovery of ‘repressed memo-
ries’.  Laboratory evidence for improvement or 
recovery of memory due to hypnosis is weak and 
hypnotic procedures aimed at such may lead to 
memory distortion and confabulation.  Indeed 
evidence from clinical practice itself has indi-
cated that detailed confabulation, in the form of 
false memories of sexual abuse in childhood, may 
result from this application of hypnosis.   
How much of this matters?  There is sufficient 
evidence that treatment protocols that are based 
on the assumptions of clinical hypnosis that I 
have described are efficacious (Lynn et al, 2010). 
Efficacy is the main concern of the clinician, even 
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if the reason why the treatment works is not fully 
understood or the ‘working model’ turns out to 
be wrong.  The obvious rejoinder to this is that the 
‘recovered memories’ controversy of the last 20 
years has exposed the dangers of failing to ensure 
that therapeutic practice is based on models and 
theories that have robust scientific support from 
mainstream psychology and related disciplines. 
And when hypnosis enters the legal and forensic 
arena, opinion should be grounded in the experi-
mental research evidence and not assumptions 
about its clinical mode of operation.  An expert 
witness who is not so informed would be given a 
very difficult time in a court of law.
Notwithstanding the above, there are areas of 
clinical practice which are clearly influenced and 
guided by experimental research.  I shall now de-
scribe, albeit briefly, three examples these.  
Firstly, it has been noted that although relax-
ation types of induction are often the most useful 
in clinical practice, if the purpose of the induction 
is primarily to enhance the patient’s responsive-
ness to suggestions then experimental research 
indicates that other inductions may be used when 
appropriate.  For example, some practitioners oc-
casionally report using inductions that emphasise 
mental alertness and increasing energy rather 
than relaxation (Bányai, Zseni, & Forenc, 1993; 
Capafons & Mendoza, 2010; Gibbons, 1979; Heap 
& Aravind, 2002). 
A second area of cross-fertilisation of theory 
and practice is that of pain control.  There are var-
ious ways one can use hypnosis to assist in pain 
relief and pain management (Jensen & Patterson, 
2008; Patterson, Jensen & Montgomery, 2010) 
and laboratory and clinical investigations have 
jointly contributed to developing effective pro-
cedures (Montgomery, DuHamel & Redd, 2000) 
and elucidating what may be the mechanisms that 
underly their efficacy.   
Thirdly, both laboratory and clinical research 
into the influence of hypnotic suggestion (includ-
ing self-suggestion and imagery) on physiologi-
cal functioning may indicate how and in what 
circumstances hypnosis may be used in treating 
a number of medical condtions including those 
that have been termed (though less so nowa-
days) ‘psychosomatic’.  These include studies of 
gastrointestinal activity (e.g. Klein & Spiegel, 
1989; Whorwell, Houghton, Taylor, & Maxton, 
1992), blood flow (Barabasz & McGeorge, 1978; 
Dikel & Olness, 1980), and respiratory function-
ing (Isenberg, Lehrer & Hochron, 1992).  Clearly 
investigations such as these are relevant to the 
hypnotherapeutic treatment of problems.  There 
has also been great interest in the effect of sug-
gestion on immunological functioning (Moore & 
Tasso, 2008).  
Laboratory studies of how suggestion and 
imagery may influence these physiological pro-
cesses has obvious relevance to their application 
to somatic disorders (e.g. irritable bowel syn-
drome, headaches, asthma and dermatological 
complaints) but well-controlled clinical trials, of 
which there are a growing number, are necessary 
to ascertain if any changes that may be effected 
are enduring and of clinical significance.  Also 
the role of hypnotic suggestion, as distinct from 
more general effects such as relaxation, needs to 
be clarified.  
Finally it is worth recalling what was earlier 
noted about the role of hypnotic suggestibility in 
treatment outcome.  It may be more than coinci-
dence that it is in the two aforementioned areas of 
application – pain and somatic disorders – where 
positive relationships have more often been ob-
served in clinical studies. 
Conclusion
Does clinical hypnosis have anything to do with 
experimental hypnosis?  The message of this paper 
is not that clincal practitioners of hypnosis must 
always pay heed to the academic research litera-
ture and must amend their ideas and practices ac-
cordingly.  The working models of hypnosis that 
they adopt will be those best suited to their needs 
and those of their patients or clients and these 
may not necessarily coincide with those of the 
experimentalists.  The aim of this paper is simply 
to raise the question of how much experimental 
and clinical hypnosis have in common with each 
other and how much the former informs the lat-
ter.  Perhaps the answer to both these questions is 
‘not as much as is often implied’.  
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